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The Quantum Car
Robert Malaney∗
Abstract—I explore the use of quantum information as a secu-
rity enabler for the future driverless vehicle. Specifically, I inves-
tigate the role combined classical and quantum information can
have on the most important characteristic of the driverless vehicle
paradigm - the vehicle location. By using information-theoretic
verification frameworks, coupled with emerging quantum-based
location-verification procedures, I show how vehicle positions
can be authenticated with a probability of error simply not
attainable in classical-only networks. I also discuss how other
quantum applications can be seamlessly encapsulated within the
same vehicular communication infrastructure required for loca-
tion verification. The two technology enablers required for the
driverless quantum vehicle are an increase in current quantum
memory timescales (likely) and wide-scale deployment of classical
vehicular communication infrastructure (underway). I argue the
enhanced safety features delivered by the ‘Quantum Car’ mean
its eventual deployment is inevitable.
Introduction - In next-generation wireless networks, location
information will be elevated to an almost pivotal role. A
clear example of this is in the emerging vehicular network
paradigm, e.g., [1, 2]. In this paradigm, vehicles will commu-
nicate various attributes on themselves (e.g. speed, direction,
location) every 100 milliseconds. Such information will be
combined with information gathered from on-board sensors
such as laser systems, optical-recognition systems, and spatial-
map processors, so as to deliver the driverless-car paradigm,
e.g. [3]. Great strides are already being made in this endeavor,
and many would argue that the (classical) driverless vehicle
1.0 has already arrived. One aim of this letter is to encourage
consideration of the enhanced benefits offered by the driverless
vehicle 2.0 - the quantum version.
Clearly, the accuracy and verification of the location in-
formation in vehicular networks will be a mission-critical
requirement. However, upon trying to unconditionally verify
the location of a vehicle solely within the classical realm
we are immediately confronted by a noteworthy problem -
it is impossible. Classical information can be copied, thus
rendering any location verification system solely based on
it attackable from a well-resourced adversary, e.g. [4, 5]. A
potential solution to this is quantum location verification
(QLV). As the name implies, QLV in essence adds quantum
information into the location verification process. Such infor-
mation, unlike its classical counterpart, cannot in general be
copied exactly - the no cloning theorem [6]. This theorem
leads to QLV when it is coupled to another law of physics -
the no-signalling principle of relativity.
The notion of QLV first appeared in the scientific literature
in 2010, as a means of securing real-time classical commu-
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nications to a unique spatial position [7].1 Since then many
works related to QLV have appeared in the literature, e.g. [8–
15], largely focusing on information-theoretic security issues
under different conditions. As I discuss more later, it is widely
accepted that under known attacks, QLV is effectively secure. It
is the main purpose of this letter to investigate the performance
of QLV under the two most feasible attacks, showing how
quickly it can overcome such attacks to any required accu-
racy. I also highlight how other quantum technologies using
the same QLV infrastructure lead to a much-enhanced, and
effectively unhackable, vehicular network.
QLV in Vehicular Networks - Within our system a reference
station (RS) is defined as any communicable device within the
vehicular network infrastructure whose location has already
been authenticated. The prover vehicle (PV) in the system is
a vehicle which is yet to be authenticated (i.e. its claimed
location is yet to be verified). I will assume that most (if
not all) of the quantum information to be used in the QLV
protocol is pre-stored in the PV’s on-board quantum memory.
This information could have been delivered to the PV through
an optical communication network (for example) when the PV
was last hooked into its ‘electric-quantum’ charging station.
To help keep our adversary (Eve) on her toes, I will
assume that the stored quantum states are non-orthogonal and
take any allowable (possibly hidden) form, e.g. continuous
variable (CV) states, qubits, qudits, hybrids, etc. I allow for
some states being entangled (possibly with states at multiple
RSs). I will assume that coded signals sent from the RSs
to the PV (instructing the PV in each round as to which
operations to undertake on which quantum states) are wireless
signals traveling at light-speed - I refer to these signals as
the verification information (VI). All VI (in a single round
of the protocol) is obtained by the PV at the same instant.
I will assume that the VI is encoded across a subset of RSs
(randomly selected at each round), and all communications
between RSs are secure (e.g via quantum keys). The actual
number of RSs encoding the VI can also form part of the
coded VI (i.e. a null signal from an RS can form part of the
code). Coded VI received could imply instructions related to
subsequent VI arriving ǫt time later. The number of bits of
information encoded in the VI signal (for at least some rounds)
can be a priori unknown. In general, the output of the PV upon
receipt of the VI will be classical and/or quantum signals sent
to at least three RSs. To pass a verification test, the time taken
to receive this output must be bounded by the round-trip time
for the RS-PV communications, plus the legitimate-receiver
1Two months after [7] another proposal on QLV appeared in the literature
[9]. Three months after [9], a 2006 patent [16] on ‘tagging systems’ for line-
of-sight objects, based on entanglement, was first brought to my attention [17].
To the best of my knowledge, the patent [16] first introduced the application
of quantum information to object location verification.
2processing time.2
Our adversary, Eve, is formidable - being fundamentally
constrained only by the laws of physics. Most concerning for
our QLV system is that Eve has at her disposal an unlimited
number of colluding devices. Eve’s internal communications
can be classical and/or quantum, and are limited only by the
non-signalling principle. I assume Eve can transmit secretely
and directly through anything, knows the locations of all RSs
at all times, and can intercept any signal sent by any RS. I
also assume Eve’s finite energy supply is limited only by the
weak requirement that it is not detectable (e.g. via relativistic
effects such as those influencing GPS timings [18]).
Gaussian States - For clarity, henceforth I will focus on
the use of Gaussian CV quantum states (e.g. [20] for review)
within the QLV system. In terms of the annihilation and
creation operators aˆ, aˆ†, the quadrature operators qˆ, pˆ defined
for photon states are (~ = 2 assumed) qˆ = aˆ + aˆ† and
pˆ = i(aˆ† − aˆ ), satisfying [qˆ, pˆ] = 2i. The quadrature
operators for a CV state with n modes can be defined by
the vector Rˆ1,...,n = (qˆ1, pˆ1, . . . , qˆn, pˆn ). Gaussian states
are characterized solely by the first moments
〈
Rˆ1,...,n
〉
and a covariance matrix M , whose elements are given by
Mij =
1
2
〈
RˆiRˆj + RˆjRˆi
〉
−
〈
Rˆi
〉〈
Rˆj
〉
. M can be trans-
formed into Ms =
(
A C
CT B
)
where A = a˜I2 , B =
b˜I2 , C = diag (c+, c−), a˜, b˜, c+, c− ∈ R, and I2 is the
2 × 2 identity matrix. In this form the symplectic spec-
trum of the partially transposed covariance matrix is ν± =
([∆±√∆2 − 4 detMs]/2)1/2 , where ∆ = detA+detB−
2 detC . From the symplectic spectrum many fundamental
properties of Gaussian states can be derived (see [20]). An
important Gaussian state is the two-mode squeezed vacuum
(TMSV) state, described for two modes a and b as |s〉 =√
1− λ2
∞∑
n=0
(−λ)n|n〉a|n〉b, where λ = tanh(r) ∈ [0, 1] , and
where |n〉a and |n〉b are Fock (number) states of modes a and
b, respectively. Here, r is a parameter quantifying the two-
mode squeezing operator S2(r) = exp
[
r
(
aˆbˆ− aˆ†bˆ†
)
/2
]
.
The covariance matrix for the TMSV state can then be
written MT =
(
vI
(√
v2 − 1)Z(√
v2 − 1)Z vI
)
where the
quadrature variance v = cosh(2r), and Z : = diag(1,-1).
The TMSV state, being easily produced and manipulated,
will likely play an important role in the Quantum Car. As well
as being available for rounds of the QLV itself, the TMSV
state could also be used as part of a quantum key distribution
(QKD) process, in which a vehicle which has passed a location
verification test is then allowed to set up secret keys between
itself and other RSs. Indeed, the infrastructure and resources
required for QKD in the vehicular setting are very similar
to those required by QLV. Further, some of the messages
transferred during rounds of both protocols can be ‘double-
dipped’ upon. For example, classical information returned by
2Processing time is fundamentally bound by the energy available to
evolve between orthogonal states (see [19]). An adversary must have enough
(undetectable) energy to ensure her additional combined processing time is
undetectable. In the two feasible attacks studied here, I will assume enough
energy is available to make all processing delays effectively zero.
the PV could also be used as part of the error estimation phase
of QKD. Combined QLV/QKD can be achieved directly via
the use of some entangled states shared by the PV and RSs (or
by the logically equivalent ‘prepare and measure’ schemes).
Instruction on which states stored in memory are to be used
for QKD can be sent as part of the QLV-VI request.
Decision Frameworks - Before discussing feasible threat
models, let us first consider a generic formal decision frame-
work based on some observation vector Y . Our specific task
within the context of the Quantum Car is to construct a binary-
decision framework for determining whether claimed location
information (e.g. a GPS report) delivered in the IEEE 1609.2
frames is to be trusted or not. If yes, the vehicle will retain (or
be supplied with) a valid 1609.2 certificate; if no, the vehicle’s
existing certificates (if any) will be revoked (see [2]). The
ith element of the vector Y is of the form Yi = Ui + Xi,
with Ui being the value of a required metric estimated by (or
from) an honest PV, and Xi being some unwanted noise. For a
malicious PV I assume Yi = Vi+Xi, with Vi being the value
of a required metric being estimated by (or from) a malicious
PV. In all models considered here I take Xi to be a zero-mean
normal random variable with variance σi. Let i = 1 . . .N ,
N being the number of RSs participating in the measurement
process at a given round (in some circumstances fewer RSs
can be compensated for by more rounds). For simplicity, I
assume σi = σ for all i.
Let us consider two hypothesis, the null hypotheses H0,
and the alternate hypothesis H1. Under H0 I assume the
PV is legitimate, is at its claimed location (known by it
exactly), and follows all coded instructions sent to it by the
RSs in an honest and optimal fashion. Under H1 I assume
the PV is malicious, holds as many devices as there are
RSs participating in the measurement process, with none of
those devices actually at the claimed location. Assuming the
observations collected by different RSs are independent, under
H0 the observation vector Y = [Y1, . . . , YN ]T follows a
multivariate normal distribution, Y |H0 ∼ N (U ,Σ), where
U = [U1, . . . , UN ]
T is a mean vector, and Σ = σIN . Under
H1 we have Y |H1 ∼ N (V ,Σ), where V = [V1, . . . , VN ]T is
a mean vector (note we have implicitly assumed the variance
is the same under both hypothesis).
Assuming a likelihood ratio test, which is known to be
optimal for a wide range of cost metrics within the realm of
classical location verification frameworks [21–23], the follow-
ing decision rule for our system (written as a ratio of likelihood
functions) can be constructed, Λ (Y ) , p(Y |H1)p(Y |H0)
D1≥
<
D0
λ, where
λ is the threshold, and D0 and D1 are the binary decisions
that infer whether the prover is legitimate or malicious, re-
spectively. Given our assumption of Gaussian noise this can
be re-written as T(Y )
D1≥ Γ: T(Y ) <
D0
Γ, where T(Y )
is the test statistic given by T(Y ) , (V −U)T Σ−1Y ,
and Γ is a new threshold corresponding to T(Y ) given
by Γ , lnλ + 12 (V −U)T Σ−1 (V +U) . Note, in this
notation, the false positive rate and detection rates are α ,
Pr (T(Y ) ≥ Γ|H0) , β , Pr (T(Y ) ≥ Γ|H1) , respectively.
3Finally, a cost metric is chosen, as this will determine how
to set the threshold λ (if the metric is optimized). A common
choice for this is the total error TE = P0α+(1−P0)(1−β),
and I adopt that here with the a priori probability of legitimacy
set at P0 = 1/2. Having built our decision framework, let us
now investigate a specific use of our generic QLV system.
In general, the PV does not know what operation(s) on what
state(s) is needed at each round of the QLV until the full VI for
that round is obtained. Faced with this, Eve can take two quite
feasible approaches to attack the system. One is to wait until
all the VI for that round is received, identify the CV state(s),
determine which of her devices it is stored in, and then act
on that state(s). The second is to try and copy the quantum
information optimally beforehand, distributing copies to all
devices, and act on those copies (as needed) as soon as the VI
is fully received at each device. We refer to the first strategy as
the time-delay attack, and the second strategy as the optimal-
cloning attack. Our aim is to quantify the performance of the
legitimate system against these two feasible attacks.
Let us consider the time-delay attack where a quadrature
measurement is requested in a given round on a specific stored
CV state - the result of which is broadcasted. In the attack, the
classical output is delivered by Eve’s devices to the required
RSs - albeit at some vector of delays td (due to the time
needed for Eve to communicate the measurement outcome to
all devices). Using our previous relations we can determine the
total error in the classification of the PV as a function of the
verification distance and the number of observations N . The
results of such a calculation are illustrated in Fig. 1a (left),
which shows how the total error can be made arbitrarily small
by increases in N . Similar trends to Fig. 1a can be found for
other operations on the states.
In the optimal-cloning attack Eve utilizes a machine [24]
that would copy a CV quantum state to multiple (one for each
RS) optimal-fidelity clones [25]. In such an attack there is no
time delay incurred (relative to an honest PV). However, any
operational measurement on the cloned state(s) will lead to
different statistics relative to the original state(s). For example,
consider when the VI requests some stored CV states be sent
to specific RSs (the legitimate system has the states needed
for any comparison test). Fig. 1b (right) illustrates the case of
a quadrature measurement operation used as a discriminating
test in the scenario where the attack utilizes optimal clones
derived from a single coherent state.3 Here I have used the
general result that for Nc → Mc (Mc ≥ Nc) cloning of
Nc general coherent states, Mc ≥ 2 being the number of
equal fidelity optimal clones produced, the variance of the
cloned states σcl will have an additional minimum variance
(2/Nc − 2/Mc) σ0, where σ0 is the variance of the vacuum
noise [25]. Discriminating between the different hypothesis in
this circumstance takes a different form from a delay attack
(the variance is no longer the same under both hypothesis).
The test statistic for N observations (now the number of states
tested) becomes
N∑
i=1
(Y
i
− Ui)2, and the threshold takes the
3The discrimination error by this (readily implementable) technique is
greater than the Helstrom bound [27]. Quadrature measurements on other
CV states (e.g. squeezed) can be optimal [28].
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Fig. 1. (a) Total error (TE ) in QLV under a time-delay attack (color online).
Here the RSs are all randomly positioned, λ = 1, and the standard deviation
of the Gaussian noise in the timings is set at 1µs. Eve has positioned her N
devices optimally, each of them being some distance (the verification distance)
from a claimed location. (b) TE , the false negative rate (1−β), and the false
positive rate (α) as a function of the observation number (number of states
tested), under an optimal-cloning attack. Here 5 optimal copies from 1 state
are used, and λ is set so that Γ = 2N . Perfect quantum memory of the
legitimate system is assumed, and timing information is assumed verified.
The attacks (a) and (b) are the most feasible (simplest) from a classical and
quantum perspective, respectively.
form Γ = [(2σ0σcl) / (σcl − σ0)]
[
logλ+N log (σcl/σ0)
0.5
]
(here the Yi’s and Ui’s now refer to quadratures). Under these
circumstances the false-positive rate is given by 1−χ2N (Γ/σ0),
where χ2N (x) is the chi-square cumulative distribution function
with N degrees of freedom at the value x. Similarly, the
detection rate is given by 1 − χ2N (Γ/σcl). Fig. 1b displays
all the error rates for a specific parameter setting. Again, we
can see that reduction of the total error with increasing N is
once again possible - and that the total error can in principle
be made arbitrarily small. Similar trends to Fig. 1b can be
found for any cloning attack, including squeezed states and
TMSV states (different tests may be used on the states).
Note, that I do not build into any H1 the possibility of a so-
called teleportation attack [12]. Several issues can justify this.
Arguably, the most important issue is a pragmatic one - the
amount of resources needed for the attack in general appear
unfeasible.4 In this work I simply adopt this view. However,
I do also note, from an information-theoretic perspective, that
in general the required teleportation needed for the attack is
not available.5 For example, in CV-based QLV schemes the
required CV teleportation (deterministic with unit fidelity) is
not possible at finite energy.6 As such, it may be useful to
4The best bound on the number of entangled pairs needed for a successful
teleportation attack (with unit fidelity obtained in the infinite port-number
limit [26]) is of the form 2O(n), where n is number of states to be
teleported [13] (I remind the reader that 2270 ∼ the number of nuclei in the
observable universe). Pragmatism aside, an exponentially increasing amount of
entanglement can eventually become detectable through its associated energy.
Creation of any bipartite entanglement costs energy for temperatures T > 0
[32]. Reaching T = 0 requires infinite heat extraction.
5By this I mean with zero probability of detection using finite resources.
That said, the attack of [12] poses a formidable in-principle challenge to QLV.
For example, in the QLV of [7] 2N N -bit messages are encoded in a non-
orthogonal ensemble of stored entangled states, the ensemble being decoded
later via classical inputs. Infinite resource issues aside, specific cases of [7]
(e.g. dimension-N maximally-entangled qubit states with no null-signalling
code component) are in-principle attackable by the explicit procedure given
in [12]. Expanded expositions of the main concept in [12] are possible,
but ultimately all energy requirements (e.g. teleportation, unitary evolution,
erasures) must be bounded.
6Of course, realistic energy levels can push the CV teleportation fidelity
arbitrary close to 1, but a non-unit fidelity is in-principle detectable (multiple
rounds of teleportation at finite energy should enhance such detection).
4look at the question posed by a teleportation attack from more
of a limited legitimate-system viewpoint rather than from an
attacker’s in-principle viewpoint.7
Finally, I discuss how some quantum states can influence
timing measurements made within the vehicular network.
Assuming classical only signals, and Gaussian noise with
variance σt in all the timing measurements, the variance νcr
of the position error of a device located at (x0, y0) satisfies,
ν
1/2
cr ≥ c
√
σtN
(
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
sin2 (ϕi − ϕj)
)−1/2
, where the
ith RS is at (xi, yi), tanϕi = (yi − y0) / (xi − x0) and c is
the speed of light (e.g. [29, 30]). For some estimated position,
we can see this leads to a 1/
√
N dependence for the location
error. Implicit in the above bound is also a 1/
√
Np dependence
on the mean number of photons, Np, used in each timing
measurement. Quantum positioning [31] invokes the use of
entangled states to shift this dependence to the form 1/N ,
with squeezed states being used to provide a dependence
of the form 1/Np. Fundamentally, both gains can be traced
back to a higher spread in energy in the non-classical states,
relative to coherent states. The resulting improved timings
could be used to enhance the verification-decision process,
or be used to simply enhance actual (or relative) position
estimates of vehicles. For example, consider positioning via
the use of laser signalling between vehicles. In this scenario,
location errors in the sub-mm range can be anticipated using
levels of entanglement and squeezing already achievable in
the laboratory. Classical wireless positioning can sometimes
lead us into the realm of the ‘dark arts’ (e.g. removal of
biases, nuisance parameters [30]). The addition of quantum
positioning techniques can only shed (non-classical) light.
Outlook - Our driverless vehicle 2.0 is certainly of the future
- but not the distant future. The two main enablers needed -
quantum memory of 1-day lifetime (or time between electric-
quantum charges) and widespread vehicular communication
infrastructure - appear within reach. Advances in quantum
memory lifetimes are improving dramatically, with the current
record (at a temperature of 2K) at 6 hours [33]. Confidence
is high that photonic long-term quantum memory at car-boot
temperature is achievable in the coming years [34]. Aside from
the initial delivery of the quantum information (e.g. via optical
fibre), QLV ‘in-the-field’ can operate with only classical
wireless communication infrastructure - deployment of which
in the wider vehicular context has already commenced. Of
course, the driverless vehicle 3.0 will be even further advanced,
deploying additional quantum technologies and applications.8
But 2.0 may keep our vehicle engineers busy, at least for now.
Conclusions - The quantum technologies discussed here
will have many applications, offering unparalleled security
and sensitivity in many scenarios. However, if the number of
lives saved is the optimization metric of choice, use of these
technologies in a widely-deployed vehicular network could
7E.g. - For some 0 < ǫ < 1, under what restrictions on the operations
of a legitimate system, can an adversary using some defined finite resource
produce an undetectable attack with a success probability 1− ǫ?
8For example, entanglement (perhaps macroscopic) shared between vehicles
for enhanced inter-vehicle control and network synchronization.
well deliver the optimal quantum-communication application.
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